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RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
• 27 States now have some form of Right to Work (RTW) laws on the books.
• Most were passed in the 1940’s (12) and 50’s (6) but 6 were passed after the year 
2000.
 Indiana   (2012)
 Kentucky (2017)
 Michigan (2013)
 Oklahoma (2001)
 West Virginia (2016)
 Wisconsin (2015)
20% of the RTW have been passed 
in the last 18 years.
So what has changed?
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RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
“Right-to-work” is a misnomer. It is not a 
right to a job. It is the right to work in a 
union-represented workplace and enjoy 
union wages, benefits, and 
representation without paying union 
dues. 
It works because most unions are 
certified by the National Labor Relations 
Board (private sector only) or a state 
agency to represent workers in a 
bargaining unit. By law, all workers in a 
bargaining unit are entitled to equal and 
fair representation even if the worker 
does not pay dues.
Map: www.mochamber.com (Missouri 
Chamber of Commerce)
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RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
Right To Work 
State
Right To Work Date
By Statute or 
Constitutional 
Provision
Right To Work State Right To Work Date
By Statute or 
Constitutional 
Provision
Alabama Friday, August 28, 1953 By Statute Nebraska Wednesday, December 11, 1946 By Constitution
Arizona Tuesday, November 5, 1946 By Constitution Nevada Thursday, December 4, 1952 By Statute
Arkansas Tuesday, November 7, 1944 By Constitution North Carolina Tuesday, March 18, 1947 By Statute
Florida Tuesday, November 7, 1944 By Constitution North Dakota Monday, June 28, 1948 By Statute
Georgia Thursday, March 27, 1947 By Statute Oklahoma Sunday, September 2, 2001 By Constitution
Idaho Thursday, January 31, 1985 By Statute South Carolina Friday, March 19, 1954 By Statute
Indiana Wednesday, February 1, 2012 By Statute South Dakota Tuesday, July 01, 1947 By Constitution
Iowa Monday, April 28, 1947 By Statute Tennessee Friday, February 21, 1947 By Statute
Kansas Tuesday, November 4, 1958 By Constitution Texas Friday, September 5, 1947 By Statute
Kentucky Saturday, January 7, 2017 By Statute Utah Tuesday, May 10, 1955 By Statute
Louisiana Friday, July 9, 1976 By Statute Virginia Sunday, January 12, 1947 By Statute
Michigan Friday, March 08, 2013 By Statute West Virginia Friday, February 12, 2016 By Statute
Mississippi Wednesday, February 24, 1954 By Statute Wisconsin Monday, March 9, 2015 By Statute
Mississippi Tuesday, June 7, 1960 By Constitution Wyoming Friday, February 8, 1963 By Statute
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Wagner Act (1933)
The Wagner Act specifically stated that companies could legally agree to be classified as any of the following:
•Closed Shop – In a closed shop, employees must agree to be members of a union as part of their 
employment. Employees who ceased being members of the union for any reason, whether it be through the 
failure to pay their union dues or being outright kicked out of the union, were to be fired on the spot, whether 
they violated any of the employer’s other rules or not.
•Union Shop – A union shop permits the hiring of non-union employees, provided they join the union within a 
certain specified time period.
•Agency Shop – In an agency shop, employees were required to pay the equivalent of what it would cost to 
be represented by the union. However, they were not required to actually join the union.
•Open Shop – In an open shop, an employee cannot be forced to join a union, or be made to pay the 
equivalent of union dues to the union. The employee is also protected from being fired in an open shop if he 
ultimately decides to join the union.
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Taft-Hartley (1947)
• Taft-Hartley Act gives individual states permission to outlaw the union and agency shops for 
employees working within their jurisdictions.  Thereby repealing parts of the Wagner Act. 
• Such laws that criminalize these kinds of situations are called “right to work laws”.
• So states have the right to decide the and they do it by either passing a constitutional amendment, 
or a statute.
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RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
• Arguments For RTW:
 Unions increase unemployment
 Violate Free Speech
 Decrease Economic Growth
• Arguments Against RTW:
 Free Rider Problem
 Reduces workers power to control working conditions
 Increases inequality and causes class conflict  
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
There are three models of labor markets relevant to RTW laws:
 Perfect Competition in All Markets
 A Monopsony  in the Labor Market
 Union Utility (Club Theory) Model
oThe first two models are the standard models used to argue about RTW.
oThe utility model is somewhere in between 
(unions care about both wages and employment levels) 
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
The Perfectly Competitive Model
• Strong assumptions are used to show that the 
solution in the labor market maximizes society’s 
welfare.
• In this model everyone is a price taker, and there is 
no unemployment. Firms maximize profits, but do 
not make economic profits (only a fair return)
• Workers receive the full value of their work.
• The solution works this way because the Wage is 
equal to average and marginal costs.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
The Perfectly Competitive Model
• When a union enters the picture and raises 
wages to Wu, workers are now getting a wage 
premium, but unemployment is created.
• The triangle between the green, black and 
blue lines (DWL) is the loss to society because 
markets are not working.
• This is the Model RTW supporters see and 
why they believe reducing the power of 
unions will increase employment and 
economic growth. (Going back to W0 get rid 
of DWL)
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
The Monopsony Model
• In this model employers are not price 
takers, but negotiate wages and have 
some control of wage setting. They now 
make economic profits (above fair returns).
• Firms maximize profits where MRP=MC, 
hire Nm workers and pay Wm.  Both 
employment and wages are below the 
social optimum.  The DWL here is again the 
triangle between the two green lines and 
the blue lines.  
• If you hire only Nm the fair wage would be              
MRP=        .  Unemployment is (N0-Nm).W
DWL

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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
The Monopsony Model
• The union can now level the playing field 
by bargaining for wages.  Here Wu is the 
bargained wage, which is above the wage 
Wm and W0.
• In this case both employment and 
wages go up, but there is still 
unemployment and economic profits.
• DWL is now smaller than the no union 
case, so society is better off with unions.
• Note that if the union negotiated a wage 
of W0 it would correct the monopsony 
imperfections and bring society to the 
optimum.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
• The question is which model better represents the United States today.
 Which Model is better to look at the impact of unions in Higher Education.
 A number of studies have looked at the impact of unions on wages and employment in the 
economy as a whole including:
• Gould, Elise, and Heidi Shierholz. 2011. The Compensation Penalty of “Right-to-Work” Laws. Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper No. 
299. http://www.epi.org/publication/bp299/
• Moore, W.J., and R.J. Newman. 1985. “The Effects of Right-to-Work Laws: A Review of the Literature.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, vol. 38, no. 4, 571–585.
• Oswald, A. J. (I982). 'The microeconomic theory of the trade union.' ECONOMIC JOURNAL, vol. 92, pp. 576-95
• Dunlop, John T. 1950 Wage Determination Under Trade Unions. New York: Augustus M. Keely. 
• CARRUTH, A. A. and OSWALD, A. J. (1986). “On union preferences and labor market models: insiders and outsiders.” Economic Journal. 
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS 
• Higher Education may be different from other labor markets:
 National Labor Markets
 Highly educated employees who are hard to evaluate
 Wages very by discipline
 Professors control the output of future professors
o This suggests higher education labor markets may not be perfectly competitive 
with or without unions. 
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
• So how would we test to see whether unions improve society’s welfare?
• Heidi and her colleagues at EPI have suggested a model to see if RTW states 
reduce wages.
• If wages decrease and unemployment declines then this would support the 
competitive model.
• On the other hand, if  wages decrease and employment is unchanged from where it 
would have been, the monopsony model is more appropriate.
• In both cases wages decline with RTW and employed workers are hurt.  
• If wages do not decline and employment does not grow then RTW has no impact. 
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
 Data: (Possible choices)
 CPS:  Current Population Survey
• Individual Data and characteristics
• Union Data (But Not AAUP)
• Small Sample Size
 IPEDS: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
• Data by School (Type of Campus)
• Average Salary Data by Campus
• Large Sample Size
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
• IPEDS Data
• Average of Average Salary by 
State (All Sectors) for Full 
Time Faculty.
• The general trend is RTW 
States pay lower wages in 
Higher Education than Non-
Right to work States.
• Regional Differences can be 
seen in the data, so a 
regression model is needed to 
take these traits into account.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
• To see this more clearly, the 
Histogram shows that RTW 
peak at $80,000 per year, 
while Non-RTW States peak 
at $90,000.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
• In all but 4 states the 
difference between female 
and male salaries is in 
favor of male faculty.
• Without taking into 
account variables such as 
rank, department and 
years of service it is hard to 
say whether there is 
discrimination.
• But 3 of the four states are 
Non-RTW states (NY,NJ 
and AK), while the only 
RTW state is WY.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
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• The IPEDS salary data shows 
a structural shift over time.  
Initially The public sector 
offered higher wages up until 
1992-92.  Then between 
1992 and 2000, wages are 
equal.  After 2000 the private 
sector is offering higher 
wages and the gap is 
growing.  In 2017 the gap is 
over $7,000.
• Both male and female 
faculty trends show the same 
pattern.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
 Regression Analysis
 The model is similar to those used by EPI to look at the workforce in general.
 Variables: ln W: log of wages, data IPEDS average wage by campus (All (2017), Male and Female (2016))
RTW: dummy variable, 1= RTW State   0=Non-RTW State
GDP: gdp per capita by state, BEA REIS data (2017)
RPP: regional price parity by state, BEA REIS data (2017)
 Three models are estimated:  One for all salaries regardless of gender (data 2017), then two additional models one for       
female faculty the other for male faculty (data 2016)
Note: additional models by sector are left for future research. 
0 1 2 3ln PC Sw RTW GDP RPP u       
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
 Regression Analysis Results:
All Faculty Model
• The RTW states do in fact pay lower 
salaries by 5.28%, and the variable is 
statistically significant. 
• This result is in line with other 
studies which looked at the entire 
labor force.
• The other parameters are as 
expected and are significant.
• The Model as a whole has relatively 
low explanatory power, which 
should be expected when variables 
such as rank are not taken into 
consideration.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
Female Faculty Model
• The results are similar to those of the all 
faculty model, with all variables 
statistically significant.
• The R2 is higher than the all faculty 
model and suggests gender is an 
important determinant in the salaries of 
faculty.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
Male Faculty Model
• The results are similar to the other 
two models.
• The RTW parameter estimate is 
somewhat higher at 5.74% than the 
female model at 5.26%, but the 
difference is not significant given the 
standard errors of the parameters.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
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• Other than size of state 
there does not seem to be 
a pattern between RTW 
and Non-RTW states when 
it comes to the number of 
students taught per faculty 
member.
• This is indirect evidence 
that RTW laws do not 
change the level of 
employment.
Non-RTW
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
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• The trend in employment of 
Full Time Faculty does not 
seem to be changing over 
time as more states 
become RTW States.
• This would suggest the 
perfectly competitive 
model, which would predict 
an increasing growth rate in 
faculty, after 2000 with 6 
additional RTW states, does 
not represent the higher 
education labor market.
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ECONOMICS OF RIGHT TO WORK LAWS
Conclusions:
Higher Education as a labor market is somewhat different from other sectors in that it is:
• a national labor market.
• Sets salaries by discipline so doesn’t have a traditional salary scale.
• Has workers in control of the number of workers coming on the market.
 Even with this our initial analysis on RTW laws support the concept that:
• The higher education sector is not perfectly competitive, but follows a monopsony model.
• Unions move wages and employment in the direction of the social optimum
• RTW laws have a similar impact on Higher Education as the other sectors in the economy.
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Thank you
28
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 14 [2019], Art. 13
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/13
